

S.A.S. Talking Notes  
Saturday November, 7, 1987

6

1500 Hours

MKUTANO NA MABALOZI WA TANZANIA  
KILIMANJARO TEA ROOM.

TOPIC: Hali ya Ulinzi na Usalama  
Kusini Mwa Afrika na Hasa  
Msumbiji na Role ya Tanzania.

1. INTRODUCTION

- Thanks for Invitation and opportunity to address them
- Satisfaction that they were able to participate 3rd Congress of CCM.
- Express Confidence of their continued cooperation and assistance in my capacity as NEC Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

2. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION.

- Situation in our borders general up calm.
- (a) With Kenya and Uganda normal-internal conflict in Uganda as well as Kenya - Uganda bickering and possible conflict affects us adversely.
- (b) Rwanda and Burundi - Internal developments and how they affect us.
- (c) ZAIRE - Potential Problem

- (d) Malawi - normal but SAG active there and can be used to infiltrate MNR etc.
  - (e) Zambia - okay but watch out for internal situation.
  - (f) Mozambique situation and its impact on our security especially in our Southern Regions: Ruvuma, Lindi and Mtwara.
3. Highlight nature of struggle in Southern Africa underscoring MFA's expose of the political economic and diplomatic avenues.
4. ISDSC Session in November 1986 marked a turning point in the Military and Security cooperation among the Frontline States (FLS):-
- (A) Reports on the Internal Security situation of Member States revealed:
    - (i) determination of the enemy to cause maximum instability in our respective countries.
    - (ii) Escalation of acts of repression by the apartheid regime in South Africa and Namibia.
    - (iii) Enemy's strategy is to use our countries as the alies of operations by arming, equipping and guiding dissident groups.
- Currently principal victims are Angola

and Mozambique.

- But Zimbabwe and Zambia also targeted.
- Tanzania cannot altogether be excluded in Pretoria's grand design. Indeed there are reports of Tanzanians being trained by South Africa.

(B) ISDSC Resolved:

- (i) provide active and concrete support to Mozambique to confront MNR bandits.
- (ii) In order to facilitate (i) above to seek international material support.
- (iii) Intesify support to NLMs so that they can pin down South Africa's armed forces in Namibia and South Africa proper.
  - In other words exploit enemy's vulnerability by refusing to allow the theatre of operations to be transferred to our countries.

5. Recall my Meeting with our Ambassadors/High Commissioners in LONDON in January 1987.

- Recapitulate the salient points
  - (a) Mozambique's request to Tanzania
    - 2 to 3 Bn to Zambezia - for 3 months operations according to General Chipande!

(b) Decision of the Party and Government to assist and why that decision was made.

6. Give a Graphic expose of the situation that prevailed at Quelimane then and the enemy strategy to capture Zambezia as was the consequences of the possible materialisation of that strategy.

7. What have we done at the Military level

- deployed a Brigade Group.

(a) Achievements:

- Quelimane now secure.

- Our Forces are at Quelimane, Licuare, Nicuadala, Zero, Luabo, Mopeia, Chimuara and Morrumbala.

(See Map giving Sitrep as of Nov.06,1987

- my visit to the FRONTLINE July,1987)& impressions.

(b) PROBLEMS

- Logistics and Supplies

- Casualties and Nature of Operation.

8. The Economic and other Costs of the Operation.

- Rely on ourselves for almost everything.

- 1987/88 Budget \*

- Maintenance of Security in addition to our commitments in Mozambique .

(Training Teams - Mozambique , Zimbabwe and Uganda).

9. The MOZAMBICAN PERFORMANCE.

- This war is not just military. The political, economic and social dimensions are as important and in some cases more important.
- Mistakes being committed by FRELIMO & FPLM.  
Lack of Govt structure.  
Weaknesses of the Party.
- Failure to implement agreed decisions e.g. Training in Nachingwea and Meda.
- Liason Team in Quelimane.

10. PRESENT SITUATION

(a) Militarily:

Zimbabwe Forces in MANICA, SOFALA and TETE.

- NACALA Railway will be operational: Here elaborate on the Malawi FACTOR.
- FPLM operations currently at a standstill for lack of ammunition, bombs and POL (Petrol, Oil and Lubricants).

(b) DESPERATION OF THE BANDITS and their scattered operations Northward and Southwards.

- Activity in Niassa and Cabo Delgado.

Capture of 60 Tanzanians near the village of MPOMBE.  
Attack and destruction of GOMBA opposite MASSUGURI.

- Threat against Tanzania is real.

(c) The Refugee Factor

over 100,000 and the pace is rapidly increasing.

- What to do with them: Possible infiltration  
of bandits masquarading as refugees.

11. THE PROBLEMS FACING US.

- (i) This is a very costly operation and bound to be more costly.
- (ii) Even in the best of times this operation is difficult. Now it has come at the worst possible time.

(iii) UPUNGUFU WA ZANA NA SILAHA ZA MSAADA.

- Matatizo ya Usafiri na Vipuli.
- Magari yaliopo - less than 20% of requirements.
- Only 5% of our planes operational.
- USAFIRI wa Bahari - Matatizo makubwa.
- Tatizo la Mafuta etc. - Foreign exchange.

- (iv) Tatizo la supplies.
- (v) Barabara za Mipakani

(Mpaka wetu Kusini kuanzia Kyela  
mpaka Mtwara ni 850 km.)

- (vi) Worst Problem in uncertainty. How long we will be there: Recall Mengistu's counsel.

12. THE NEXT COURSE OF ACTION.

- (i) Liberation of Mileage na kusafisha Zambezia.  
(ii) Training of some 6000 Mozambicans in Mueda - Implications costwise.  
(iii) Kudhibiti Niasaa & Cabo Delgado.

Why this is important and its financial implications.

- Road from Masasi - Masuguri - Mtasambwala
- Bridge accross Ruvuma.
- Neongomane - Mueda by Road.

13. MOBILISING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

- (i) Objective: (a) Avoid East/West confrontation on the issue.  
(b) Mobilise practical assistance.

(ii) What has been done:

- (a) My trips to Cuba, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Algeria, USSR and Czechoslovakia.
- (b) Rupia's trip to India.
- (c) MFA's trip to Eastern Europe in conjunction with other FLS Ministers.
- (d) our discussions with envoys in Dar es Salaam.

comrades in the FPLM.

- PROBLEM IS SERIOUS

We must do our duty at the same time we must strengthen our defence preparedness and capability to thwart any possible aggression by SAG and/or its surrogates.

(iii) What has been the outcome thus far

India

Algeria

Cuba

Yugoslavia

Bulgaria

USSR

China

GDR

Czechoslovakia

Nigeria

- the U.K. Factor.

- N.B. Total assistance as  
of 27/09/87 estimated at  
Shs. 1,064,000,000.

(iv) What must be done

Intensify mobilisation for material assistance  
such as logistical equipment. Transport and  
communication, medication, clothing etc.

- the Role of our Envoys pivotal.

15. CONCLUSION

- Struggle bound to be protracted and costly.
- Fortunately our people now understand and are supportive e.g. Michango ya Msumbiji.
- The morale of our Forces in Zambezia is very high frustrated only by the behaviour of some

1. STRENGTH OF MNR.

The strength of MNR bandits is estimated at about 15,000. Our intelligence reports suggests that some of these bandits are trained by South Africans inside South Africa.

2. SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCES

a. STRENGTH

- (1) REGULAR - 114,000 (including 64,000 National Service).
- (2) RESERVE - 317,000
- (3) ARMY - 76,400
- (4) NAVY - 9,000
- (5) AIRFORCE - 13,000
- (6) SOUTH WEST AFRICAN TERRITORY FORCE- 21,000
- (7) PARA-MILITARY - 130,000 (Commandos)

b. DEPLOYMENT

- (1) NAMIBIA - 21,000
- (2) ALONG ITS BORDER WITH:
  - (a) BOTSWANA
  - (b) ZIMBABWE
  - (c) MOZAMBIQUE
  - (d) SWAZILAND.
- (3) SURROUNDING LESOTHO.