

SAS/SG/OAU: DIARY/NOTES
TUESDAY, MAY 03, 1994

Rwanda

One day Trip to Arusha for Consultation regarding the Rwanda Peace Process

1200 Left Addis for KIA via Entebbe by ET 821 (Boeing 767) to attend Rwanda Peace Talks. Travelling with Mapuranga; Felli, Zoula, Mustoofa & Somda.
I expect to return tomorrow morning.

1545 Arrived in Kilimanjaro International Airport and met by RDD as well as by Mdoe & Mwinyi. Stayed at Mount Meru Hotel - Suite 514. But did not sleep. Had programme right through as follows :

1830-1900 - Meeting in my Hotel suite with Foreign Minister Rwegasira and Minister of Defence, A. Kinana together with the Tanzania team.

1905-1920 - Meeting with the Ambassador of Egypt in Tanzania who came to Arusha to attend the Talks as one of the observers.

1945-2230 - Meeting with Chairman of RPF - Colonel Alexis Kanyerengwe, SG of RPF, Dr. Rudasingwa and

2315-0035 - Meeting with Government Delegation comprising
(1) Minister of Communication
(2) Minister of Justice
(3) Minister of Home Affairs & Community Development.
(4) Amb. Kanyarushoke, Rwanda Ambassador in Uganda.
(5) Amb. Mugema, Rwanda Ambassador to the OAU and Ethiopia.

0055 to 0110 - Telephone conversation with Prime Minister & 1st VP John Malecela - Briefed him on the salient points of our discussion with both the RPF and the Government delegations and the way ahead.

0120-0215. Meeting with Tanzanian delegation: FM, MOD, Ambassadors Tambwe, Oponga, Lwendo, Personal Assistant to MFA, Ileti, Grace Olutu and Liberata Mulamala.

0220-0245 - Discussion with the OAU delegation.

Salient Points on my discussion with RPF Chairman and Delegation

N.B. The delegation of the RPF was led by its Chairman, Colonel Alexis Kanyerengwe. Other members of the delegation were Dr. Theogen Rudasingwa, Secretary General and Mr. Simon Ntare, Political Admission Office of the Chairman.

Salim: Expressed sadness and condolences for the deaths of so many people.

- Pointed out OAU's stand on this. Expressed hope that every effort will be made to put an end to these massacres and end hostilities.
- Clarity of view that the conflict is not just ethnic.

Chairman of RPF

- In the massacres and killings that have been perpetrated, entire political elite - both Tutsis and Hutus (who are in the opposition) have been wiped out.
- There are some who deliberately refer to the conflict in simply ethnic terms. This is wrong. Boutros Ghali characterized the conflict as the war between Tutsis and Hutus and the present International Force of Intervention is supposed to provide protection to the victims (i.e. Tutsis). But since all Tutsis who can be killed have been killed, what then is the purpose of the International Force? Is it to protect the killers?
- One of the ironies of the situation is that as a result of the liquidation of the elite, the only elite remaining are those who are outside in exile. And they are mostly Tutsis.
- Referring to the killing of Habyarimana and the subsequent killings, RPF Chairman asserted there was indeed a coup d'Etat against the Arusha Peace Agreement. The coup was planned before Habyarimana died.
- In response to the concerns, outcry and appeals of the International Community, RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire. But this was not reciprocated by the other side (i.e. interim Government).
 - The RPF condition was that the cease-fire should be a subject of discussion between the RPF and the Rwandese Army. This is a realistic option because the Army has control over the so called interim Government. Such talks between the Armies will constitute a first reliable step on what is to be done.
- For the RPF it is very difficult if not impossible to negotiate with (the Team which is here).
- The Army Commanders in the field (i.e. those of RG & RPF) can start the process and the Politicians can see what can be done.
- Repeating the theme as to why they are in Arusha, the RPF

Chairman said that he and his delegation are in Arusha with the purpose of explaining their position to the Facilitator. They have come to show their respect (to President Mwinyi) for his continued concern and support.

- The RPF would also explain their position to the Secretary General of the OAU.
- On the proposed International Force of Intervention, they have noted that Boutros Ghali has laid emphasis on the show of Military Force. But such a Force is to protect whom? RPF will find it difficult to accept such a Force. However, they have no problem in having a force which will deliver relief convoys and provide humanitarian assistance.
- Need for investigation leading to prosecution and punishment for those who have been involved in massacres and killings in the country.
- People who have been responsible for the killings and massacres must be held accountable.
- Gave an example of the inflammatory and incendiary statements made by the interim President who, in the aftermath of his visit to Butare, killings began to be intensified.

Salim's Remarks

- I can speak on the issue of massacres and killings without any sense of guilt because the OAU and myself have been clear and unequivocal in condemning the same. We share the agony and the disgust of this tragedy.
- The OAU has strived to mobilize and sensitize the international community.
- We have put pressure on the UN when they decided to drastically reduce UNAMIR.
- Our position has begun to pay. The world outrage and Boutros Ghali's recent recommendation should be seen in this light. There is now overwhelming pressure for action. It includes that of NGOs and humanitarian groups which are genuinely concerned. It reflects the world opinion which is shocked and appalled at what they see on the TV screens. It also reflects the embarrassment of Western Governments.

The RPF would make a mistake to underestimate this pressure.

- My own position is to support a more enhanced role for UNAMIR. This position is consistent with OAU's consistent stand. I do

not favour an intervention Force as such but a strengthened UNAMIR which will (a) provide humanitarian relief; (b) provide protection to civilians where that is needed and (c) assist in the establishment and supervision of the ceasefire.

- But the nature & mandate of the Force would depend on the attitude of the RPF (and the other belligerents). Simple opposition to the Force would not sell. Nor is the argument that all the Tutsis who were to be killed have been killed, credible to prevent the sending of such a Force.

The RPF should therefore accept the concept of the Force and work to see that (a) it does meet the requirements of humanitarian considerations and (b) does not live up to the worst fears of the RPF. i.e. A force to protect "the killers".

- The issue of ceasefire is important and urgent. We cannot leave Arusha without letting the world know that there is a definite and credible commitment for a ceasefire.
- Recalled what I told Dr. Rudasingwa when we were last in Arusha on April 23, 1994. Unilateral declaration of ceasefire is not enough. There must be a signed agreement. Rudasingwa took with him some proposals namely that the RPF leadership will communicate its political directives to the Commander in the field to have negotiations with the RGF side on the establishment of ceasefire and also for its consolidation and observation. He promised to send us a reply the next day. I waited for 48 hours but there was no word from the RPF.
- The issue remains central. The RPF does not have to recognize the Government. But a ceasefire must be agreed upon. Since RPF cannot or would not discuss with people who are here, then there is a need for a clear commitment (a) of reaffirmation in favour of a ceasefire and (b) that RPF Commanders will be directed to hold ceasefire negotiations with their counterparts in the field.
- In our last contacts with RPF Secretary General, Dr. Rudasingwa, the question of forum for negotiations for the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement was raised. This requires to be followed up.
- What role did the RPF feel the OAU can play at this stage. Or should it have any role at all?

RPF Chairman

- We seem to be in agreement that the International Force should be essentially humanitarian in nature. The terms of reference

and modalities of operations should be agreed upon by the parties.

- Agree for discussion with the other side on the question of cease-fire. We are prepared to commit ourselves so that our Commanders can take up the question in the field. We are even prepared to set a date for it.
- Need to have a national Mechanism for ensuring that massacres and wanton killings do not recur. (Point made by Dr. Rudasingwa)
- Beyond the questions of ceasefire arrangements is the creation of conditions for a durable solution. (Point made by Dr. Rudasingwa)
- On the OAU's role, it is his view, that if the OAU had been involved right through, then some of the things (problems) which have happened would not have happened. It was obvious that for the duration of the time that the OAU was in Rwanda, things went by and large very well. The OAU must therefore take an active role. The RPF has always supported the involvement of the OAU.

Salim

Since the RPF is committed to a ceasefire but is not prepared to sign an agreement with the delegation of the Rwandese Government here, can we have a statement by the RPF and co-signed by the Facilitator and the OAU in which the RPF would :

- (a) Reaffirm its commitment for a cease-fire;
- (b) Direct its Commanders in the field i.e. in Kigali to discuss practical modalities to establish a definite ceasefire; work out practical modalities to ensure its observation and consolidation; (c) mandate/request the Commander of UNAMIR Forces to organize a meeting between the RPF and RGF Commanders, as soon as possible with a view to arriving at an agreement.

RPF Chairman

Agreed with that. In fact (as Dr. Rudasingwa explained) the RPF had in mind to make a statement tomorrow in those very lines.

The RPF is also prepared to suggest a specific date for such a meeting.

SALIM

In the circumstances, we as the OAU and Facilitator might also

ask the Government delegation here in Arusha to make a similar undertaking i.e. to commit themselves to direct the Rwandese Army to get into negotiations with the RPF Commander in the field.

RPF Chairman/Secretary General

We cannot accept that because it will give legitimacy to the so called Government. They will use such statements internally for their own propaganda purposes. If you are to get such a statement from the other side (i.e. Government delegation) then the RPF would prefer to issue its statement unilaterally.

SALIM

I really do not see why this course of action should not be acceptable. This is not recognition by you. We have to deal with both sides. In any case, we can forget about asking the Government side to issue a statement but we can and we will try to get them to make the commitment to us.

N.B. The RPF Chairman did not appear satisfied even with this argument. But he did not raise objection as such. And with that the matter rested.

I concluded our meeting by again emphasizing the imperative need that the participants at the Arusha consultation cannot and should not leave Arusha without an unequivocal and credible commitment on a ceasefire.

The meeting which started at 1940 ended at 22.30 hours.

Meeting with the Rwanda Government Delegation

Present on the Rwandese side were :

1. Andre Ntagerura, Minister of Transport and Communication (Leader).
2. Mr. Munyanzesa, Minister of Home Affairs and Community Development.
3. Mme Agnes Ntanabyariro, Minister of Justice.
4. Ambassador Kanyarushoki, Rwanda Ambassador to Uganda.
5. Romuald Mugema, Rwanda Ambassador to the OAU & Ethiopia.

On the OAU side were :

1. Dr. M. Mapuranga, ASG, Pol.
2. Mr. Joe Felli
3. Col. Gustav Zoula
4. Mr. Mustoofa

5. Mr. Somda.

SALIM

I began with the usual pleasantries and then immediately went on to express our outrage, anguish and disgust at the carnage and killings that have taken place and continue to take place in Rwanda. I underscored the responsibility of the Government to put an end to those massacres and killings asserting that such horrors should be a major preoccupation of the Government.

I then raised the issue of the ceasefire and underscored the imperative need to bring that about without any further delay if we are to sustain world interest and concern on the plight of the Rwandese people. The world can easily or conveniently turn its back. "We are part of you. Your pain is our pain and your crimes are in effect ours (in a sense of reflecting on all Africans)

I recalled my discussion with the RPF and insisted that what is important is to have a ceasefire. People can be innovative on how that can be brought about. Thus the idea of the Commanders in the field discussing, negotiating and signing a ceasefire should be followed up. The Government can give political directives to the Army to do so.

I referred to the question of the proposed international Force and solicited the opinion and views of the Rwandese Government side. I also wanted to know their views on the role of the UN and the OAU.

Rwandese Government Minister

The Leader of the Rwandese Government delegation Transport and Communication Minister, Andre Ntagerura responded and made the following remarks (N.B. Reproduced are main elements of his response).

- Expressed regrets for not having been in Arusha on 23 April during the scheduled Peace Conference. He attributed this to lack of communication.
Stated that there were confusing reports that the RPF was supposed to be in Gbadolite to sign a Ceasefire Agreement. He alleged that the RPF had in effect agreed to be in Gbadolite but then did not turn up. The Government delegation which he led went to Gbadolite and signed an Agreement. That Agreement provided for an Accord to be signed by Rwandese Government and Rwandese Patriotic Front. It called for cessation of hostilities, return of displaced persons and the end to the killings.
- Thus on the issue of ceasefire we are ready as we were in

Gbadolite. We are ready to discuss with the RPF. We are for an immediate ceasefire.

- In order to monitor the ceasefire there is a need for a strong United Nations Force. It should be a UN Force strengthened in manpower and material equipment.
 - We support the presence of an Intervention Force that can play its role properly including stopping the killing; prevent (by force if necessary) resumption of hostilities and prevent violations of ceasefire.
 - This Force to be established through consultation between the UN and the OAU.
 - Force can have neighbouring countries among its constituents. But these neighbouring countries which RG has problems with (did not identify them) should not be on the Force. Those who should be in the Force among the neighbouring countries should be agreed upon by consensus of the two parties.
- On the issue of killings, Government regrets that it cannot put an end to the killings because its forces are involved in other fronts. (emphasis added).
 - the RPF says that hostilities will only stop when killings have stopped. But this is not realistic because Government cannot contain the killings (for as long as the hostilities continue).
- Finally, the Minister (after being sent a note by the Minister of Justice) asserted that while the Government can mandate the Commanders in the field to work out modalities of the ceasefire, the Agreement on ceasefire should be signed between the Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

The meeting with the Rwandese Government delegation lasted 1 hr 20 minutes i.e. from 2315 to 0035 hours.

Discussion with Prime Minister Malecela

When I met with Foreign Minister Rwegasira and his colleagues earlier in the evening soon after my arrival at Mount Meru Hotel from the airport he told me that the Prime Minister (who arrived this afternoon from Dar es Salaam), would like to meet with me as soon as possible. But he would prefer that I do so after I meet with the delegation of the RPF so that we can exchange notes before he, the PM meets with the RPF delegation.

As things turned out, however, my meeting with the RPF and RG

delegations extended long after midnight. I was prepared to meet with the PM then but he telephoned from his residence (Prime Minister's guest house in Arusha) and thus we talked on the phone. Thus I gave him a resume of the salient points of my discussion both with RPF and RG delegations and in particular highlighted those ones which I believe the Prime Minister as the Representative of the Facilitator can make use of in an effort to get some movement in the current impasse. More specifically, I dwelt on the issue of ceasefire and International Force.

I told the Prime Minister I would be meeting shortly with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and will give them an extensive briefing so that they can brief him before he meets with the RPF tomorrow. I also told him that I was leaving within a few hours for Addis.

Meeting with the Representative of the Facilitator of the Arusha Peace Process

The meeting took place in my Hotel suite Room 514 Mount Meru Hotel.

The Facilitator (i.e. President Mwinyi) was represented by the Foreign Minister, Hon. Joseph Rwegasira, M.P. He was accompanied by the Minister of State, President's Office, responsible for Defence and National Service, Colonel Abdul Rahaman Kinana and several officials including Ambassador Tambwe (TanzanRep. in Kigali), Ambassador Joshua Opanga (TanzanRep. in Kampala), Ambassador S. Lweno (D/AME), the Personal Assistant to the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ileti and Ms. Grace Olutu and Ms. Liberata Mulamala of the Foreign Ministry.

I was assisted by Dr. mapuranga, Mr. Felli, Colonel Zoula and Messrs. Mustoofa and Somda.

Resume of my discussions with the RPF and RG

I gave the Tanzanian delegation as Facilitator, a resume of my discussion with both the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Government delegation. More specifically, I adumbrated the areas of understanding reached or identified as follows :

I. Meeting with the Chairman of the RPF

A. CEASEFIRE

1. Reaffirmation of commitment to a ceasefire. Prepared to issue a statement to that effect. Also prepared to sign a statement which can be signed by the Representative of the Facilitator and the Representative of the OAU as witnesses. But will not sign such a statement, if the Government side will also be

asked to do so.

2. Readiness to mandate the Commanders in the field work out modalities of the ceasefire with the Commanders of the Rwandese Army.
3. The UNAMIR Force Commander shall be mandated to contact the Commanders of the two Forces for purposes of working out ceasefire modalities.
4. A time frame would be indicated for the commencement of negotiations on the modalities of the ceasefire; in any case they would start as soon as possible.

B. INTERNATIONAL FORCE

1. The RPF would go along with the setting up of an international Force to protect humanitarian activities in terms of escorting vehicles carrying relief supplies to the displaced persons and other affected populations. Such a Force can also help to protect civilians where necessary.
2. The Force which shall also monitor the ceasefire should not be an intervention Force.
3. It should be agreed to by the two parties. It should have a clearly defined role and mandate.

II. Meeting with the Rwandese Government Delegation

A. Ceasefire

1. Commitment to an immediate ceasefire.
2. Readiness to consider mandating Commanders in the field to negotiate modalities with RPF Commanders.
3. Agreement on ceasefire should be signed between the interim Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.
4. UNAMIR Force Commander should arrange a meeting of the Commanders for the purposes of negotiating modalities of a ceasefire.
5. UNAMIR should monitor the ceasefire.

B. International Force

1. Government prefers an intervention Force to :
 - (a) stop the massacres.
 - (b) to stop ceasefire violations.
 - (c) to prevent resumption of hostilities.
2. The intervention Force should be well equipped with adequate

resources for its task.

3. It should have a clearly defined mandate which should be broad enough to carry out its tasks as defined in (1) above.
4. The Force should be constituted following consultations between the OAU and the UN and with the consensus of the two parties. Neighbouring countries can be part of the Force but only on the consensus of the RG and RPF.

U.S. Military Intervention?

At the end of our meeting, Foreign Minister Rwegasira said that the U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania who was in Arusha with several other Ambassadors to follow the Rwanda Peace Talks said this evening in front of the Foreign Minister and the other Ambassadors that the United States is prepared to intervene militarily in the Rwanda crisis. The Ambassador further told Foreign Minister Rwegasira that he would want to meet with the RPF delegation and that finally the Ambassador will tell the RPF so.

I told the Foreign Minister that all the public statements and private discussions I have had with the U.S. clearly indicate that no such intervention is envisaged. If what the Ambassador said is true, then this is a radical departure of U.S. policy. But knowing U.S. policies and the Clinton Administration position, I do not believe that there is any possibility of such direct intervention. US policy is to support and encourage OAU and neighbouring countries to see what can be done. I simply do not believe that the US has taken any decision of military intervention by U.S. troops. This is simply far fetched. But since the US Ambassador has said that to the Foreign Minister, immediately upon my return to Addis later today, Wednesday, May 4, I will take up the matter with the United States Ambassador to Ethiopia, Marc Baas.