

- \* 1. Introduction not clear
- 2. spelling
- 3. learn how to use commas, single + double quotes
- 4. Use standard bibliographic forms & fn forms
- \* 5. you advance key pts without adequate evidence or discussion - see, eg, pp. 7, 14.
- \* 6. you do not define key term of reference, see, eg, p 23.
- 7. a great deal of your description centers on US policy based on one NYT story. You should make this - & its import, if any, for your analysis - clearer to readers.

UNITED STATES POLICY  
ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

8. Not clear just what you do conclude re merit of interests responsible concerning US. policy. Is it congressional US interest (which will be put straight as soon as Black Africa threaten withdrawal) or what? This makes less than wholly useful your concluding statement.

9. see comment inside margin.

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April 20, 1974

Your papers reflect great interest & work, but you need more practice & discipline in analysis.

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# UNITED STATES POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

## INTRODUCTION

### Aim and Scope

This study will examine United States policy on Southern Africa. In order to reduce the scope of the paper to manageable proportion, it is not intended to make a country by country study. Rather, the paper will focus on the overview of United States relations toward the sub-region. Emphasis will be given to the examination of American ties with Portugal. Particular attention will be given to American assistance to Portugal and how this affects the whole Southern African confrontation. The rationale for this approach stems from the fact that the Portuguese colonies in Africa, due to their strategic location, are the vanguard of the current conflict. *ie why?* Analysts generally agree that the events in Angola and Mozambique are bound to decisively determine the trend of events in the whole of Southern Africa.\* In 1971, the London based Institute for the Study of Conflict published an analysis by one of Britain's top military analysts. The analysis seriously questioned Portugal's ability to maintain its colonial rule in Africa. The role of the United States assumes a particular significance when

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\* Note that the term "Southern Africa" is used in this paper in conformity with the current U.N. nomenclature to denote the territories under colonial and white minority domination. These are Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, Namibia (South West Africa) and South Africa. For this purpose even the West African territory of Guinea Bissau which declared its unilateral independence from Portugal on September 24, 1973 and the Portuguese dominated islands of Cape Verde are included.

viewed in the context of Portugal's obvious inability to prosecute its colonial wars in Africa without massive outside assistance. For American support of the Government in Lisbon appears to be a crucial, if not decisive, determinant affecting the perpetuation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

① Although South Africa will not be given special focus, it must be pointed out, that, for obvious reasons, the apartheid regime of that country will remain the ghost walking through~~out~~<sup>3</sup> the discussion. The white regimes of Southern Africa (including that of South Africa) increasingly act in concert against the liberation movements. Indeed, South African military forces are known to be operating in Rhodesia. <sup>2</sup> South Africa also continues to defy the United Nations by illegally clinging to the territory of Namibia (South West Africa). Lastly and for the purpose of the current study, more importantly, the political (ideological) and strategic reasons for United States support for, or link with, South Africa apply mutatis mutandi to the rest of the Southern African regions under discussion here.

The paper will deal mainly with United States policy during the Nixon administration and more particularly the period of the seventies. Such a focus is not only for the purpose of examining issues which are current, but also - and more significantly perhaps - for the fact that there appears to be a manifestly activist American policy towards the area in this period.

*you mean this then*

*meaning?*

*if this is a key term, define on list  
NF*

It is generally accepted that it is in the domain of foreign policy that President Nixon has made the most positive impact. His bold and constructive foreign policy initiatives with regards to strengthening detente with the Soviet Union and leading the way to rapproachment with the People's Republic of China are viewed by many, both within and outside the United States, as commendable achievements. Regrettably, however, not all foreign policy initiatives of Mr. Nixon have been 'positive'. From the point of view of an African ~~as~~ as indeed of all those who support majority rule in Southern Africa - it would seem apparent that the "activist" foreign policy of the Nixon administration in Southern Africa is notable for its negative approach. The more or less "neutrality" and "watch and see" attitude adopted by the Johnson administration, which had replaced the "more understanding" policy of President Kennedy towards African aspirations, has now been replaced by the "deepening alliance between the United States Government and business" with the forces of status quo in Southern Africa. An examination of selected issues reflecting American policy in Southern Africa will testify to this. Thus, to Clarke and Shepherd, the Nixon-Caetano "Azores Agreement, the sale of Boeing 707's to Portugal, the erosion of Rhodesian sanctions and increased U.S. investment in that area remind us once more that American power and influence is not on the side of the black majority". Or to quote Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the United States House of Representatives,

① [ ]

*what committee?*

*arrived 1st para*

Congressman Charles C. Diggs:

... recent U.S. actions with respect to the liberation of the areas of Africa remaining under colonial and minority rule imply that the United States supports the maintenance of status quo and minority rule in Africa.

There is considerable research and material on the subject of U.S. involvement in Southern Africa. One of the problems facing the preparation of this study has been how to select and condense such material for a limited project of this nature. Unavoidably, therefore, the paper may at times suffer from generalisations. Yet

care has been taken to reflect as accurately as possible both the official utterances and non-verbal behavior as indeed the interpretation of American position by both Administration spokesmen and those outside it - sympathisers and critics alike. Considerable literature on Southern Africa has been examined. Congressional records, United Nations records and working papers as well as reports by various interested groups, body corporates and organizations have been consulted. Newspaper articles and journals have also proved useful. A systematic review has proved invaluable in understanding the nature and extent of U.S. involvement in Southern Africa, as well as in grasping Washington's policy in the light of this involvement.

NO  
SENSE

pts 2 + 3 not clearly  
discussed — what are your  
central Qs? why should they  
need to be included in the  
answers?

II

THE SOUTHERN AFRICA CONFRONTATION: A REVIEW

One of the most dominating issues in Africa today is undoubtedly the confrontation at the Zambezi river. To the north of the river two hundred and fifty million Africans live in independent states shaping their own destinies and preoccupied with the problems of survival and development. But south of the Zambezi are the powerful and intricate forces of white supremacy and colonial domination over South Africa, Namibia (South West Africa), the Portuguese dominated territories of Angola and Mozambique, and Rhodesia. In these territories, the minority white regimes have entrenched themselves, determined to maintain and perpetuate their presence by repressing and oppressing the African majorities.

The basic issue involved here is not of recent origin; the inherent right to struggle for freedom and self-determination is a matter of fundamental principle and of universal concern. The nature of the conflict with its strong racial overtones, furthermore makes it all the more relevant and critical problem for the international community. Referring to the growing danger of race war emanating from this conflict, Sir Alex Douglas Home, when he was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in the mid-sixties, warned:

"I believe the greatest danger ahead of us is that the world might be divided on racial lines. I see no other danger not even the nuclear bomb, which could be so catastrophic, as that".<sup>5</sup>

Likewise, many African leaders have also been in the forefront in drawing this danger to the attention of the world. Thus, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, whose country occupies a especially important and strategic position as the Southern frontier of black power in the confrontation, has observed that a race conflagration in Southern Africa would make the Middle East conflict look like a 'picnic'.<sup>6</sup> More recently, the former British Foreign Secretary, talking to journalists in London on the situation in Southern Rhodesia in May, 1973, once again cautioned that "there has to be an evolutionary political settlement or else there will be a confrontation not only in Rhodesia but on the rest of the African Continent. I cannot imagine any thing more catastrophic than that".<sup>7</sup>

The danger of a race conflict is only one, though admittedly more serious, aspect of the problem of Southern Africa. Another aspect is the growing involvement of the major cold war antagonists on the separate sides of the confrontation. In this connection, China, the Soviet Union, and the East European powers in general have sided with the liberation movements while some of the NATO members and particularly the United States, seem to be identified with the white minority regimes in Southern Africa. This trend is welcomed neither by the liberation movements nor by the leaders of independent Africa who, for obvious reasons, do not wish the African continent to become, in the words of Tanzania's President Nyerere, "a hot front to the cold war", and "the freedom struggle in Southern Africa becoming confused by a power conflict which is irrelevant to it."<sup>8</sup>



For the last ten years a military confrontation has been going on in the area. This confrontation between the African liberation movements and the white minority regimes in Southern Africa has now reached a new and explosive stage. The Liberation Movements with the active support of free Africa and equipped largely by arms and ammunition from the socialist countries, principally China and the USSR, are now posing a major challenge to the white minority establishments. The achievements of the Liberation Movements have been particularly evident in the Portuguese colonies where they have created liberated zones. <sup>9</sup> The African freedom fighters south of the Zambezi now number in tens of thousands. Besides the support and assistance that they receive from the African, Third World, and Socialist countries, they are also assisted by a number of smaller West European countries, particularly the Scandinavian States, as well as by political, church and other groups in most other West European countries.

Pressure therefore, is now on the racist minority regimes in Southern Africa. It is significant that despite overwhelming superiority in arms at their disposal, and notwithstanding the massive economic and other assistance rendered to these regimes by the Western world, <sup>10</sup> they are currently constantly under the pressure of the liberation movements. Indeed, the issue is no longer whether the white regimes can contain the liberation movements; rather, how much longer can they do so? Put differently, the relevant question now is how much more bloodshed and what greater sacrifices need

?  
evidence? argument?

there be before the cause of freedom and self-determination can finally triumph in Southern Africa. In this connection, the role of the United States both as the most powerful world power and as the leader of the NATO alliance from whom the white regimes and particularly Portugal derive their support, is crucial.

### III

#### GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

It is a generally accepted premise in international relations that nation-states conduct their foreign policy in line with their 'national interests'. It follows therefore that the policy of the United States in Southern Africa is predicated on how Washington's policy planners and decision makers perceive of U.S. interests in that African sub-region. At the same time, it must be pointed out that there does not appear to be a consensus among the different centres of powers within the United States as to what really constitutes that country's national interests in Southern Africa. At least within Congress, there are many who do not favour the maintenance of the status quo in Southern Africa. It would appear that even within the bureaucracy, that consensus does not exist. In this regard it is pertinent to read the views of a prominent Congressman relating to the divergencies that prevail between the United States Mission to the United Nations and the European Department of the State Department.

In his press statement made on December 17, 1971 following

his resignation as a member of the United States delegation to the 26th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly in protest against U.S. policies in Southern Africa, Congressman Charles Diggs, Jr. of Michigan, <sup>Party?</sup> ~~inter alia~~, stated:

"[US Mission and Ambassador Bush] have fought for a more enlightened position and have lost to the European Bureau to the economic and to the military groups which have been dominating the policy of the United States vis-a-vis Africa issues, as well as to "watch-dogs" of Southern African policy which have relegated unto themselves the decision making authority so that positions on this area are the peculiar responsibility of the White House at the National Security Council level."<sup>11</sup>

*This doesn't make much sense*

In addition to exposing the apparent contradictions that exist between the U.S. Mission and the European Department and the obvious ~~paramourcy~~ <sup>MP</sup> of the latter on matters of Southern Africa, Congressman Diggs attests to the nature of different pressure groups at work. In this connection, due ~~cognisance~~ <sup>MP</sup> must be given to the role of domestic structures in the formulation, planning, and execution of the foreign policy process of nation-states. In respect of American policy in Southern Africa, significance of such domestic factors are easily perceived. Critics of the Nixon administration like the Congressional black caucus point out that the largely negative role the Administration plays in Southern Africa is in line with President Nixon's so called Southern Strategy. This presupposes appeasement of the Southern Senators and Congressmen as well as the Southern constituency generally where the concept of majoritarian rule in Southern Africa is unlikely to evoke much

*(1)*

sympathy!

Since the issue of United States "national interests" in the area, is a subject of differing interpretations, it would be advisable not to overemphasize this point. Rather, prudence demands that a more rigorous way of analysing American policy in Southern Africa is to take into account the views of both the protagonists of the status quo i.e., supporting directly or indirectly the white regimes in Southern Africa, and those arguing for a change - indeed a radical shift - of American policy in support of the African majorities in the area. The present situation leads one to conclude that the former school of thought seems to have an upper hand in United States foreign policy. It is therefore logical to consider the argumentation and rationale behind the current policy.

What then are the political, strategic, economic and other factors responsible for current United States policy in Southern Africa?

Political and Strategic Factors

*of what?*

The strategic value of Southern Africa is currently being given considerable weight in Washington. It is argued that the stability of the area is important for the maintenance of the sea lanes through the Cape. Such links are important for the maintenance of vital communications between the Western world and other parts of the globe. The <sup>↑</sup>security<sup>↓</sup> of the Cape of Good Hope has assumed even greater significance following the closing of the Suez Canal

and the utilisation of the Cape route as a vital lifeline for the West and particularly the countries of Western Europe. The crucial energy supplies of the Western world from the Persian Gulf pass through this important channel linking the Indian and the Atlantic Oceans. According to available statistics, in 1971, Italy received 84.5 per cent of its oil from the gulf; Britain nearly 66% while France more than 50 per cent. The United States imported 8 per cent of her supplies from the area again using the Cape route. <sup>12</sup>

To the protagonists of the status quo in Southern Africa, United States strategic and security interests dictate that the regimes in Southern Africa must be friendly and "dependable". Such friendship and dependability is assured in the white minority establishments of the sub-region and any alterations of the political map of the area could adversely ~~effect~~ <sup>13</sup> the balance of power in the area, so the argument goes. The reported build up of Soviet naval activities has heightened United States interest in the strategic value of the Cape in particular and Southern Africa in general. The United States has used the reported Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean to promote its own expansion. In this respect the proposals of the United States to expand its military facilities on <sup>13</sup> the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia despite opposition - in some cases vehemently pronounced - of a number of littoral states including India, <sup>14</sup> Sri Lanka, <sup>15</sup> Australia, New Zealand and several <sup>16</sup> African States. Parallel to the objective of establishing a naval

*do you doubt reports?*

*active*

Not  
CLEAR

base at Diego Garcia, is the articulation of the 'crucial' importance of the Southern African strategic 'security' for the "free" world. Indeed it would appear that apologists of white supremacy in Southern Africa have attempted to link Soviet naval expansion in the Indian Ocean with the need to support and reinforce the white regimes in sub-region. Thus Neil Bruce in his article "Portugal's African Wars," argues:

"With the build-up of the Soviet navy in the Atlantic and especially in the Indian Ocean, the West cannot ignore the vital strategic importance of Portugal's East African and Atlantic possessions, with its excellent harbours and Airfields down the Mozambique coast to South Africa; up the coast of Angola; with, to the north, Bissau and, the Cape Verde and the Azore Islands."<sup>17</sup>

The moral of this argumentation is that the West must support the white establishments in Southern Africa. For only these regimes provide the surest guarantee for the defense of vital strategic interests of the Western world. The United States as the leader of the "free" world has even greater interests in the sustenance of the regimes of such "trustworthy" allies. This line of reasoning is in line with the sophisticated propaganda offensive of the South African authorities in their projection of Pretoria and Lisbon as the front line defenders of United States and Western interests against the continuing "expansionism" of the "communist menace" in Africa. Thus as far back as five years ago, the South African Defence Minister Mr. P. W. Botha put the issue in the following terms:

"South Africa and Portugal patrol a gap in the free world's defences which no other /Western/ nation has seen fit to fill. Indeed, with Britain's withdrawal east of Suez and penetration of the Indian Ocean by Russian warships, our contribution becomes even more vital."<sup>18</sup>

This conceptualization of the African scene in terms of what many Africans consider as irrelevant <sup>to whom?</sup> cold war perceptions, seems to be shared by at least certain segments of United States armed forces. Thus, the United States Air War College in the introduction to its Strategic Appraisal of Africa South of the Sahara takes the view that:

"although the United States is not closely identified with particular African (Independent) countries, US world strategic interests call for an independent and viable Africa, an Africa free from communist take over or subversion through wars of national liberation."<sup>19</sup>

Two elements are discernible from this position. First, the so called strategic interests of preserving Africa from communist domination which falls in line with the usual claims of the apartheid and colonial regimes in Southern Africa. Second, the apparent opposition to the African liberation struggle waged by the nationalist forces against the settler establishments in that African sub-region.

It must at the same time be pointed out that the official United States position is to deny categorically any involvement militarily either directly or indirectly in support of the Southern African minority regimes. Thus Mr. James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, Department of Defense told a Congressional Hearing on November 12, 1971: ". . . our military interests and contacts in Southern

in such title?

Africa are strictly governed by U.S. foreign policy objectives in the area. As a consequence, our military relations are very limited." The Deputy Assistant Secretary went on to state that as a matter of policy the United States avoids "any military relations which could reasonably be construed as condoning or supporting the racial policies of the minority regimes or which could directly contribute to improving their capability to enforce those policies." 20

The only problem with this argumentation is that it tends to ignore or bypass the claims of the African States supported by the United Nations that such military assistance as the supply of Boeing Aircraft or training of Portuguese soldiers is in fact reinforcing Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

To sum up the reasoning used by those who advocate the maintenance of the status quo in Southern Africa for strategic and political reasons, it is assumed that the United States' interests are best assured by the preservation of white rule in the Area. These regimes by their very nature have an unending political, military, cultural and economic affinity to the Western World. The triumph of nationalist forces could alter the balance of power and thus adversely affect United States as well as General Western strategic interests in the area. In elucidating this point, it is often mentioned that the new governments of Africa and indeed those of the "Third World" in general, with their imponderable nationalistic agitations, are unpredictable and they can fall easy prey to "communist expansionism."

cf p. 12, "free world"



*By whom?*

Economic Factors

If the strategic considerations are assigned an important role, economic interests are also mentioned to justify United States involvement on the side of minority rule. Such considerations are naturally championed by those companies with extensive financial interests in the region, supported by their "sympathisers" in Congress and in the Administration.

United States economic interests in Southern Africa have been rapidly increasing. *proportionately?* In 1960, the U.S. had \$286 million in <sup>21</sup> direct investments in South Africa alone but by 1972, American <sup>22</sup> direct investments rose to \$1,025 million in the apartheid Republic.

The importance of American Corporate interests in South Africa itself can be recognized by the fact that about 300 United States companies, "including 12 of the largest, have investments valued at between \$750 million and \$1 billion" *where?* whose average <sup>year</sup> return is "about 17 per cent a year and contributes handsomely to <sup>23</sup> the plus column of the United States' balance of payment". In 1969, four major Western powers namely the United Kingdom, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and France were exporting to the white controlled territories of Southern Africa goods worth \$2,500 million but by 1972 the volume of exports had shot up to nearly <sup>24</sup> \$3,500 million (i.e., a net increase of \$1 billion in three years).

The table at Annex I showing trade statistics (Exports and Imports) between the United States with Southern Africa including metropolitan Portugal during the four year period 1968 to 1972

① serves to demonstrate the degree of increasing American economic involvement with the white regimes in the sub-region.

In addition to investment and trade, there is the important question of raw materials which Southern Africa has in considerable quantities. The supplies of mineral resources from these areas to the United States include raw materials as chromite, Antimony, Vermiculate, Diamonds (industrial and gem), Uranium, Asbestos and Manganese.

Another area of considerable importance is the involvement of Gulf Oil Corporation in Angola. In 1972, Gulf Oil was estimated to have paid 30 to 50 million dollars to Portugal in taxes and revenues and this pay for 50 per cent of Portugal's war effort in Angola. Subsequent to the October war between the Arabs and the Israelis and the utilisation of "oil weapon", the oil deposits in Angola have assumed an even greater significance. Their importance has assumed greater dimension by reports of "another Kuwait" in the Cabinda area of Angola.

IV

NIXONIAN 'ACTIVISM'

As previously indicated, the Nixon administration seems to have embarked on a more 'active' role of involvement in Southern Africa than the two preceding administrations. The latter, while not taking any decisive measures against white rule in Southern Africa, adopted policies which were generally considered as not 'too hostile' to African aspirations. The Kennedy administration was

*you mentioned it - you don't need describe or demonstrate it*

②

particularly considered more sensitive to African opinions. But in "contrast with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which sought to ostracize the white governments because of their racial policies, President Nixon has taken a series of steps to improve political and economic contacts with South Africa and with Portugal, which controls Mozambique and Angola."

Before this Nixonian phenomena of increased United States involvement on the side of the settler regimes in Southern Africa is subjected to closer examination, it would be useful to make two observations.

Firstly, though the shift in U.S. policy is significant and conspicuous, it is important to evaluate correctly its relative 'differentiation' from the two previous administrations. It is noteworthy to observe, for example, that in terms of U.S. economic involvement in Southern Africa, neither the Kennedy nor the Johnson administration took steps to disentangle the United States from the area. Indeed, American holdings in South Africa alone, increased by 80 per cent from 1963-1969. The significant point during the two former administrations however, has been a conspicuous manifestation of "disassociation" with the regimes of Southern Africa. This was 'disassociation' in the form of "denunciation" of apartheid and colonial policies and was particularly evident at the United Nations. The United States also supported the arms embargo against South Africa and appeared to be restricting official contacts with the colonial and racist

29

regimes. The Nixon administration, on the other hand, through its numerous bilateral deals with Portugal and South Africa and through its policies at the United Nations depict an image of closer 'identification' with and support for these white regimes. This trend will be considered in detail when the United States policy on the Portuguese dominated territories is examined.

The other observation relates to the historical background of United States policy in Southern Africa. The area has never been an important or crucial issue for United States foreign policy planners and decision makers. Indeed, Africa as such - both colonial and independent - seems to have been given a "low profile" in American foreign policy. Furthermore, American Governments - Republican and Democratic alike - have traditionally pursued their African policies following the West Europeans' lead. The views of Britain and France as the former predominant colonial powers in Africa in particular, have tended to weigh heavily in Washington. It was only in 1958 that the State Department established its own separate Bureau of African Affairs. And while it may be oversimplification to presume that American Administrations still view Africa wholly in the eyes of the former metropolitan powers, it is nonetheless undeniable that this dependency on the "advice" of American European allies is in some ways still a prevailing phenomena. As corroborative evidence, reference can be made to the handling of the Sahelian drought in West Africa. United States officials are reported to have explained the Administration's delayed action in assistance due to the wrong

see  
page

30

then

*Amo?*

evaluation and assessment given to them by French officials. According to these American officials, when the French Government was approached for joint measures to provide the much needed relief supplies in the former French territories affected by the drought, Paris did not seem to consider the problem "that serious". This led Washington not to press the matter. Is this not the confirmation of the hypothesis that the United States at times views Africa with "European eyes"? Would it not have been more rational and logical for the American government to make direct approaches to the capitals of the affected countries and assess the situation in the light of the evaluations made by the governments concerned than listening to the "advice" of the former metropolitan power?

Given this trend, it is not surprising that the United States has allowed itself to be "guided" by the former rulers of Africa in its policy towards Southern Africa. Critics of American policy do not hesitate to point out that this approach by the United States is based on the "community" and "identity" of interests between America and the former ( as well as current) colonial powers in Southern Africa. The convergence of interests makes the American approach suitable as it minimizes its own culpability in the area.

#### Policy Review

During the first term of his Administration, President Nixon seems to have taken a conscious decision to depart from the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations regarding Southern Africa. The old policy of disapproval of the white establishments has apparently

been abandoned. In its place, a policy of acceptance of these regimes euphemistically termed the policy of communication has been vigorously instituted. There is abundant evidence testifying to closer collaboration with the white regimes manifested through the improvement of ties with South Africa and Portugal and even taking measures calculated to bring comfort to the internationally ostracised rebellious regime of Southern Rhodesia. To quote The New York Times:

"The Nixon Administration is quietly pursuing a policy of deliberate expanded contacts and communication with the white govern-  
31  
ments of Southern Africa".

According to the same edition of The New York Times, President Nixon's decision in favour of active involvement on the side of the white regimes was made in January, 1970. This followed a review undertaken at the President's directive given nine months earlier by  
32  
the National Security Council.

33  
The New York Times' article is both useful and important.

(1) It is useful in that it provides an illuminating expose on the background behind the current Administration's policy in Southern Africa. Its importance is underscored by the fact that the article seems to be fairly accurate since other sources including official utterances of Administration's spokesmen lend it credibility. viz!

"Tarbaby" Theory

*Confusing*  
The "tarbaby" option appears to have carried the day in the National Security Council. And current policies of the Nixon Adminis-

*Identify in text*

tration are in conformity with this theory. This so-called policy of communication or continuous dialogue, would, according to its protagonists, make the white regimes modify their racial and colonial policies as a result of 'friendly persuasion'. In other words this theory is supposed to advance the concept of "peaceful change" in the sub-region.

How valid is the "tarbaby" theory in the Southern African situation? In the first place, it should be observed that such a concept is not entirely new to the region. Both the British and the French, with their massive economic and other interests in South Africa and to a lesser extent in the Portuguese colonies have been applying this theory for decades. Yet such communication has reaped no discernible dividend for the oppressed African majorities in Southern Africa and provided legitimacy for those in power. Neither the authorities in Pretoria nor those in Lisbon have shown any inclination of succumbing to "friendly persuasion". Indeed, if anything, according to various United Nations reports as given in various United Nations documentation, these regimes have intensified their colonial and apartheid policies.

Secondly, the "tarbaby" theory is a stereotype rationalization for continued economic involvement in Southern Africa on the part of the Western powers. Such rationalization is based on the premise that increasing trade leads to liberalisation. But as has already been explained, the process of intensifying American economic and trade relations with the white regimes has continued unabated. Yet,

there is no evidence of relaxation of the outmoded colonial and racist policies on the part of the Southern African partners!

Furthermore American investors do not appear very preoccupied with the plight of the Africans. Nor do they give any tangible signs of being either ready or willing to challenge the policies of the white regimes. On the contrary, they, particularly such companies as the Union Carbide Corporation and the Foote Mineral Company, seem to have increasingly become apologists for the white regimes and advocating "a more 'business-like' relationship with Southern Africa".<sup>37</sup> There are also reports of intensified and well orchestrated opposition by the body-corporates to any moves calculated to change American policies towards the regimes in Southern Africa.<sup>38</sup> Clearly therefore, both the argument of "remaining in friendly terms with the regimes in Southern Africa in order to influence them" and the claim that "economic development is a liberalising force" that would undermine the white colonial and racist systems, are sham arguments. And so therefore is the "tarbaby" theory!

There is in fact a clear danger inherent in the application of the communication theory. And this is that with the increasing diplomatic, political, economic and trade ties between the United States and the white regimes, there is bound to be a de facto if not de jure application of the so called "Acheson" theory. For the more involved the United States becomes in Southern Africa the more difficult it would be for her to disentangle herself and the more likely therefore is the probability of her direct participation in



the conflict.

The Three Options

In the final analysis, stripped of circumlutory semantics, the United States has three policy options in Southern Africa. These are (i) acceptance of the white regimes involving as it currently does toleration of these regimes' internal policies; (ii) Limited disengagement and (iii) total disengagement.

The first option is the one currently pursued by the Nixon Administration under the confusing and misleading theory of "tarbaby" or if you like the communication theory. The implications and repercussions of this policy have already been delucidated.

The last theory would appear to be the most effective one. It is however, by far the most difficult to implement from the Administration's point of view, and given past trends and current policies, it can conveniently be ruled out. For purposes of logic only, it could be said that this theory could and should be followed up with support to the African liberation movements. But then, in the words of Ambassador Newsome, "even a sympathetic observer finds it difficult to accept this path as being either right or effective" since it constituted a "road to violence".

This opposition to violence and to the liberation movements on the part of the Nixon administration is almost an 'obsession'! And yet it can neither be rationalised in terms of the history of the United States nor, for that matter, by the contemporary policies of American Governments. Leaders from independent African States

*Confusing*

*Define your terms!*

as well as those in colonial Africa who have been forced to take up arms to fight for their freedom and self-determination find it very difficult to understand, much less rationalise, this American opposition. The fact that most of these leaders are familiar with the heroic revolutionary exploits of George Washington and the leadership of Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War do not make things any easier. Indeed, American policy planners and makers like Ambassador Newsome may find it prudent to consider the advice given by a former United States Ambassador, Robert C. Good, to the United States Senate Subcommittee on Africa:

"Common sense should teach us that privileged minorities do not forswear their privileges under some sort of duress. When the privilege minority and the dispossessed majority are defined racially and where the history of repression has been long and often violent, voluntary accommodation are doubly illusory. Since it is not very helpful to favour self determination and at the same time inveigh against violence when we have nothing better to offer we would do well to leave the subject of violence out of our public discourse. As a policy prescription, our so called 'commitment to non-violent solutions' in Southern Africa is considered by most observers who are sympathetic to change in that part of the world as either naive or disingenuous. It is like saying that we are committed to the creation of a multi-party system in Russia - desirable, but not very realistic."<sup>40</sup>

① [ The second option of limited disengagement would entail no 'undue sacrifice' on the part of American 'interests'! It is however definitely more 'rational' and would at least give back to the United States much of the goodwill that it has lost in Africa. This

policy would in fact imply the pursuit of the Kennedy policy with some (minor) variations.

In the implementation of President Nixon's new 'activist' approach to Southern Africa, the Administration has embarked on a series of measures, ranging from major new economic ventures such as the Nixon-Caetano Agreement of December 1971 on the Azores Base, which inter alia provided Portugal with \$400 million in U.S. export credits, the authorization of previously forbidden jet aircraft to Portugal besides the violation of Security Council resolution on Sanctions against Rhodesia - a move which the New York Times editorially categorised as the flouting of international law. <sup>41</sup> In another editorial on December 18, The New York Times described U.S. policy on Southern Africa as "hypocritical and disastrous in the long run <sup>42</sup> for the United States."

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#### UNITED STATES AND PORTUGAL

The case of the United States relations with Portugal typifies American growing involvement with the white regimes in Southern Africa.

Portugal is a small and poor country. It has the lowest per capita income and lowest literacy rate in Europe. <sup>P.C. SNP > Timmy</sup> Yet Portugal remains today the most recalcitrant colonial power maintaining its colonial rule in territories in Africa whose total area is more than twenty times Portugal's size.

She has refused to accept the principle of self-determination

and independence for her colonial territories maintaining that these territories (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau & Cape Verde) are "overseas provinces" and not colonies. The United Nations does not accept this view. In 1960, the General Assembly called upon Portugal to recognize the right of peoples under its administration to self-determination and independence. <sup>43</sup> Thereafter, the Assembly, the Security Council and various other organs of the General Assembly have similarly made repeated calls on the Government of Portugal to end its colonial rule. The most recent call was made by the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization (Committee of 24) in its resolution <sup>44</sup> adopted unanimously on March 15, 1974. Furthermore the Assembly, the Security Council and other organs have called upon all states not to provide Portugal with assistance which enables it to continue its colonial wars in Africa. At the same time, the United Nations has requested all States and Specialized Agencies to render moral and material assistance to the people of the territories under Portuguese domination to assist them in their fight for freedom.

For more than ten years, wars of liberation waged by the African liberation movements have been raging in Angola, <sup>45</sup> Mozambique, <sup>46</sup> and Guinea Bissau. <sup>47</sup>

These armed uprisings are a result of Portugal's refusal to pay heed to the legitimate aspirations of the African people in her territories. In order to sustain its colonial wars, Portugal has expanded its military machine to such great proportions as to make the life of an ordinary Portuguese that of squalor compared to his 'affluent'

neighbour in the other European states. In 1960, Portugal had some 80,000 men under arms and total defense budget of \$93 million. But by 1973, she had a modern military establishment with more than 200,000 men under arms and a defense budget of \$425 million i.e. an increase nearing 400 percent over her 1960 figure! But perhaps more significantly is the fact that out of these troops, Portugal has deployed about 142,000 in Africa to combat the nationalist forces there and spending more than half of its national budget to wage these wars. According to another source, sympathetic to the Portuguese 'cause', the estimated deployment of Portuguese forces in Africa is as follows: 55,000 in Angola; 27,000 in Guinea Bissau and 60,000 in Mozambique.

This extravagant utilisation of Portuguese armed forces abroad together with the "squandering" of the much needed national resources for the colonial war effort has obviously been made possible due to the assistance that Portugal receives from her allies. African independent States and their supporters both within and outside the United Nations maintain that it is this support - economic, military and political - that sustains Portuguese colonialism in Africa. They argue that without it, Portugal would not be in a position to cling to its colonies. One of the most articulate of Africa's spokesmen, President Julius Nyerere, put the question in the following terms:

"Does any one imagine that one of the poorest states of Europe could, unaided, fight colonial wars in these territories /Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau/ which are together twenty times its own size? On the contrary, its NATO membership allows it almost to disregard its domestic defense needs, and devote its armies in Africa. Its membership in EAFTA strengthens the Portuguese economy, and

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thus helps that country to meet an otherwise intolerable burden." <sup>52</sup>

Portugal became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. Portugal's membership assured for the Western allies the usage of the Azores which were considered of strategic importance. In 1951, Portugal signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. In the same year the United States was allowed to use the Azores for base facilities. In 1952, United States military aid to Portugal was estimated at \$10.2 million but by 1953 the figure had jumped to \$71.5 million. <sup>53</sup> By the end of the decade, United States military aid to Portugal had escalated to the total of \$298 <sup>54</sup> million while economic assistance was to the tune of \$72.6 million.

The decade of the 1960s and more particularly the period of the 1970s has witnessed an intensification of United States assistance to Portugal. Within the limited scope of the current study it would be difficult to go through the whole gamut of U.S. assistance. But a few cases which are particularly relevant would serve to demonstrate how this assistance has helped Portugal's colonial effort in Africa. Thus in contravention to the spirit if not the letter of the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council against Portugal <sup>54</sup> the United States has been providing the authorities in Lisbon with arms, equipment and material as well as training which has certainly boosted Portugal's war machine and its capacity to prosecute the wars in Africa.

In 1971 Portugal was supplied by the United States with two Boeing 707-320c. <sup>55</sup> These planes were ostensibly for use by the Por-

tuguese Airline T.A.P. but in actuality they were to be utilised for transporting Portuguese troops to and from the African territories. Furthermore, in the fall of 1971 the United States allowed a sale of two Boeing 747's to Portugal's T.A.P. with the assistance of \$15.1 million loan from the Export Import Bank. In line with Portugal's policies, it is not inconceivable that such aircraft would also be utilised for ferrying troops to the African territories.

The United States also supplies Portugal with helicopters. Although U.S. authorities maintain that these are for civilian purposes only, the liberation movements, among others, have charged that the helicopters are used by Portuguese military authorities in their "counter insurgency" operations. The number and value of US exports of Aircraft and helicopters to Angola and Mozambique alone is tabulated at Annex II.

Military training is another field in which the United States provides assistance to the Portuguese war effort in Africa. It is known, for example, that many of the Portuguese officers trained by the United States find their way to active combat duty in the Portuguese territories. This is especially so in the case of Air Force personnel. Perhaps a more telling evidence in this connection is the reported training of Portuguese officers in anti-guerilla commando courses. The training is being done at Fort Bragg in the United States under the direction of the Green Berets. Critics of the United States support for Portugal point out that such training makes American persistent denials of helping the Portuguese colonial wars both

hollow and ludicrous.

Portugal has been accused of using defoliant as part of her war arsenal against the liberation movements. <sup>60</sup> These allegations have also been made in numerous Western news media. The Sunday Times of London for example made these accusations particularly in respect <sup>61</sup> of Angola. During the Subcommittee Hearings on the Implementation of the Arms Embargo, in March 1973, Mrs. Jennifer Davis, of the American Committee on Africa told the Subcommittee that two important herbicides, 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, had been taken off the "munitions control list". The Subcommittee had official U.S. statistics to the effect that large amounts of these herbicides had found their way to <sup>62</sup> the Portuguese dominated territories. Annex III contains a table showing the export by the United States of herbicides to Angola, Mozambique and Portugal between 1969-1972.

#### The Azores Agreement

The most important agreement to date entered between the United States with Portugal which is considered as a tremendous political, economic and military booster for the Portuguese (and by implication for her colonial war efforts) has been the Azores Agreement. The Executive Agreement, based on an Exchange of Notes between the two Governments and signed by President Nixon and Prime Minister Caetano in December, 1971, provides Portugal with the following in return for the continued use by the United States of the Azores as <sup>63</sup> a naval base: